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Re: voip calea interfaces
- From: Fred Baker
- Date: Tue Jun 20 16:43:35 2006
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On Jun 20, 2006, at 11:44 AM, Eric A. Hall wrote:
This is interesting approach. For one, it seems to cover a lot more
technology than CALEA requires. I suppose that is an artifact of
serve multiple countries' requiresments in a single architecture.
US laws include Title III of the 1968 OCCSS, 1978 FISA, and the 1994
CALEA, with updates related to PATRIOT. The US is unusual in this
respect; most of the countries that have published law or regulation
relating to lawful intercept simply state that the police have
authority to intercept any communications a surveillance subject
participates in. As such Cisco implemented the PacketCable solution
for CALEA a while, and then went on to meet the requirements of our
various customers that have IP data intercept requirements.
You might find the following of interest.It's more about e-911, but
if you want to read forensic access in as well, the shoe fits.
It's my opinion. Cisco is welcome to espouse it as well if it wants to.