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Re: Deaggregating for emergency purposes
- From: E.B. Dreger
- Date: Tue Aug 06 12:45:22 2002
PR> Date: Mon, 5 Aug 2002 18:41:22 -0400
PR> From: Phil Rosenthal
Bear with me... punchline at the end.
PR> I am currently announcing only my aggregate routes, but I
PR> have lately thought about the possibility of someone
PR> mistakenly, or maliciously, announcing more specifics from my
PR> The best solution for an emergency response to that (that I
PR> can think of), is registering all of the /24's that make up
PR> my network, so if someone should announce a more-specific, I
PR> can always announce the most specific that would be accepted
PR> (assuming they don't announce the /24's too, it should be a
PR> problem avoided)
I don't think this is a valid assumption, particularly in the
case of malicious route hijacking. Polluting IRRs with numerous
deaggregated /24s for something with little/no benefit sounds
like a bad idea to me.
You advocate "s/he who dies with the shortest as-path, and oldest
routes in case of a tie, wins".
PR> Does anyone else have any other ideas on ways to quickly deal
PR> with someone else announcing your more specifics, since
PR> contacting their NOC is likely going to take a long time...
Well, let's see... I wonder if this ever was a problem with
domain jacking, and what a registrar would do in a similar
Perhaps the answer is not to hear/announce routes blindly?
First, make sure IRRs contain proper data. Maybe maintainer
objects should be authorized by an ASN's POC, and both (maint-obj
and ASN POC) require proper authorization (crypt/md5/aes or PGP).
Use the IRRs. Granted, this will be a problem at the edge; small
providers seem to take the attitude of "why should I pay to put
my routes in the RADB when things 'work just fine' without?"
Somewhere along the line, hopefully there will be an upstream or
peer that uses the route registries.
Let clueful providers cache a copy of the IRR databases. Run a
BGP listener to cross-reference routes with IRR entries. In the
event of a suspicious route, a real-time individual query might
be useful. Flag routes that fail that test.
I'll shut up now, lest I "invent" something that smellls too much
like DNS. (Gee, maybe including some sort of "ASN authorized to
advertise this IP space" in an-addr.arpa would be too easy.)
Brotsman & Dreger, Inc. - EverQuick Internet Division
Bandwidth, consulting, e-commerce, hosting, and network building
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Date: Mon, 21 May 2001 11:23:58 +0000 (GMT)
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