## **Regional Botnet Detection**

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# Agenda

- Motivation & Vision
- PRISEM
- A Botnet Detection System
- Ongoing and Future Work
- Conclusion



# **Criticality of Local Government**

- Federal gov't wants <u>resilience</u> from all hazards
  - vs. OLD message of "preventing terrorism"
  - Effective first response is key to resilience
- Local government
  - Is first responder, last to leave scene in any disruption
  - Is where 100% of critical infrastructure is deployed
  - Infosec controls neither prioritized nor regulated
  - But, all response services are enabled by IT
- Thus, we have a problem that requires immediate attention



## Grand Challenges for State/Local Government Cybersecurity

- Antiquated technology and methods (socio-technical problem set, not just technical)
- Under-resourced and overwhelmed
  - Small regional networks often lack the security expertise necessary to take action on the information
  - Metropolitan areas need a "block-watch" model
- Key challenges:
  - Balancing privacy rights concerns with gathering & sharing quality cybercrime intelligence
  - Current information sharing methods (phone calls, bulletins, ISACs, portals, notification systems, etc.) fall short (don't scale, reactive, no aggregation, no situational awareness, classification system sometimes a hindrance)



#### DHS S&T <u>STATE & LOCAL</u> Government Botnet Technology Transfer

**Program:** DHS S&T RTAP CS 1 - Botnet Detection and Mitigation – Phase 2

Goal: Transition US-CERT technology to local and state governments through the <u>Public Regional Information Security Event Management</u> (PRISEM) project

- Enhance the information security and compliance status of participant agencies
- Provide a **method for reporting cyber-security event and trend information** to participants, and the intelligence and law-enforcement communities
- Create an operational setting for the **deployment of research**-grade technologies





# Visions

- A paradigm for local government security information and action sharing – one also applicable to small ISPs and other resource-constrained networks
  - Pilot underway involving the University of Washington, City of Seattle, and other local governments
  - Testing processes and agreements to share infosec intelligence while guarding privacy
- A <u>Community</u> and toolset enabling less-expensive federated security monitoring:
  - Repository and community around set of open-source free modular tools for botnet detection
  - http://www.botnets.org
  - Seeded with an initial set of detectors developed by the University of Michigan and Merit, funded by DHS under PRISEM (the "Botnets System")



# Privacy and Other Concerns PRISEM Pilot Attempts to Address


- These issues have been a serious obstacle to similar security info sharing efforts in the past
- Participant-driven governance
- Data retention/destruction fixed by state requirements
- Formal data-sharing agreement
- Notice of privacy practices (we don't want your user data!)
- Data access protocols and security controls



## Initial Toolset Overview (the Botnets System)

- Python-based software that implements several standalone malicious network traffic detectors
- Able to detect suspicious traffic related to botnets or other anomalous activity as seen in netflow and syslog streams
- Passive
- Scalable
- Flexible & Hackable (well-documented, OOP)
- Free (as in both beer and freedom)





### **Current Detectors**

Detector	Purpose/Features
Blacklist (and shadow, cymru, bogon, darknet derivatives)	Initialized with one or more blacklist or specific IP/prefix; detects traffic destined to addresses in blacklist; Can also help build list of all active IPs on a network
DNS	Reports DNS queries to blacklisted domains (receives syslog from resolvers)
Port Scan	Alerts when more than threshold connections to well-known ports are attempted in threshold seconds by a single source
Syn Flood	Alerts when too many syns are seen within threshold time window to the same destination
SMTP Spam	Flags SMTP server-like behavior, often indicating a compromised host
Service/Server	Flags server services (well known ports) or traffic volume indicative of likely server
IRC	Reports traffic destined to one of the several well-known IRC ports; ignores likely innocuous traffic
Feature	Alerts when a flow matching commandline-specified features is detected (e.g. src/dest ip, src/dest port, protocol, packet count)



#### Zenoss: a Poor-Man's SEM

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	4	Botnets	/Botnets/Server	Server/01-gr-lan:Vlan3/ServerIP 10.1.3.254/ServerPort 53/Prot UDP/;	2010-04-20 12:01:21	2010-06-10 12:34:1	2
	<u>A</u>	Botnets	/Botnets/PortScan	PortScan/01-gr-lan:Vlan6/SrcIP 10.1.12.21//T_Ports(10)/T_Interval(180)/;	2010-04-19 08:07:39	2010-06-10 12:30:5	5
	4	Botnets	/Botnets/Service	Service/09-holland-lan:Vlan2_and_09-holland-wan:FastEthernet0/0/ServiceIP 10.9.2.1/Service/09-holland-lan:Vlan2_and_09-holland-wan:FastEthernet0/0/ServiceIP 10.9.2.1/Service/09-holland-wan:FastEthernet0/0/ServiceIP 10.9.2.1/Service/09-holland-wan:FastEthernet0/0/Service/09-holland-wan:FastEthernet0/0/ServiceIP 10.9.2.1/Service/09-holland-wan:FastEthernet0/0/ServiceIP 10.9.2.1/Service/09-holland-wan:FastEthernet0/0/ServiceIP 10.9.2.1/Service/09-holland-wan:FastEthernet0/0/ServiceIP 10.9.2.1/Service/09-holland-wan:FastEthernet0/0/ServiceIP 10.9.2.1/Service/09-holland-wan:FastEthernet0/0/ServiceIP 10.9.2.1/Service/09-holland-wan:FastEthernet0/0/ServiceIP 10.9.2.1/Service/09-holland-wan:FastEthernet0/0/ServiceIP 10.9.2.1/Service/09-holland-wan:FastEthernet0/09-holland-wan:FastEthernet0/09-holland-wan:FastEthernet0/09-holland-wan:FastEthernet0/09-holland-wan:FastEthernet0/09-holland-wan:FastEthernet0/09-holland-wan:FastEthernet0/09-holland-wan:FastEthernet0/09-holland-wan:FastEthernet0/09-holland-wan:FastEthernet0/09-holland-wan:FastEthernet0/09-holland-wan:FastEthernet0/09-holland-wan:FastEthernet0/09-holland-wan:FastEthernet0/09-holland-wan:FastEthernet0/09-holland-wan:FastEthernet0/09-holland-wan:FastEthernet0/09-holland-wan:FastEthernet0/09-holland-wan:FastEthernet0/09-hol	2010-05-25 11:45:48	2010-06-10 11:46:0	2
	4	Botnets	/Botnets/Bogon	Bogon/12-warren-wan:FastEthernet0/0_and_12-warren-lan:Vlan2(ACL_113)/SrcIP 10.12.2.	2010-06-10 11:45:20	2010-06-10 11:45:2	0
	4	Botnets	/Botnets/Service	Service/01-gr-lan:Vlan3/ServiceIP 10.1.3.109/ServicePort 524/Prot TCP/;	2010-05-28 13:20:08	2010-06-10 11:45:1	6
	4	Botnets	/Botnets/PortScan	PortScan/01-gr-Ian:VIan6/SrcIP 10.1.12.111//T_Ports(10)/T_Interval(180)/;	2010-04-12 08:59:10	2010-06-10 11:41:0	3
	4	Botnets	/Botnets/Service	Service/35-hc-3-1:Vlan21/ServiceIP 10.35.21.53/ServicePort 29/Prot TCP/;	2010-05-27 09:36:20	2010-06-10 11:27:3	9
		Botnets	/Botnets/Service	Service/35-hc-3-1:Vlan21/ServiceIP 10.35.21.51/ServicePort 29/Prot TCP/;	2010-05-27 09:28:20	2010-06-10 11:27:1	4
	A.	Botnets	/Botnets/PortScan	PortScan/33-lan-6506:Vlan12/SrcIP 10.33.12.173//T_Ports(10)/T_Interval(180)/;	2010-04-10 08:35:34	2010-06-10 11:23:2	6
		Botnets	/Botnets/Service	Service/01-gr-Ian:VIan24/ServiceIP 172.16.24.4/ServicePort 443/Prot TCP/;	2010-04-20 09:52:32	2010-06-10 11:06:5	0
	<u>A</u>	Botnets	/Botnets/Service	Service/01-gr-lan:Vlan3/ServiceIP 10.1.3.108/ServicePort 524/Prot TCP/;	2010-05-24 16:12:46	2010-06-10 11:04:0	5
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### Zenoss: a Poor-Man's SEM

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# **Ongoing and Future Work**

- Botnets System (detectors) pilot in progress: Sys. Validation by having alerts investigated by actual Merit customer, Davenport University
- Incorporate pilot and user feedback
- Evaluation with other SEM (e.g. Alienvault OSSIM)
- Enhance current & create additional detectors
- Build a community around core toolset and a repository for maintained open source detectors



# **Conclusion: The Trickle Down Effect**

- Trickling down NSP-SEC sorts of activities to lower regional and local communities is a challenge
- Sharing and coordinating with peers is only one aspect of the problem, we need to ensure diffusion of both expertise as well as condensed knowledge and alerts to all layers
- State/Regional government structures and issues are similar in nature to the relationship between service providers and customers as well as regional networks and campuses or even a campus and its departments
- Our goal is to create a co-operative environment where groups can share some basic tools, architectures, and knowledge to make it easier to implement a minimal set of current best practices



#### **Thank You!**

#### Other Feedback and Questions

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## **Backup Slides**



# **City/Regional Information Sharing**

- How it's done today:
  - Phone calls and personal relationships
  - Online Publications / Blogs and Sites / DHS Daily
  - Portals, ISACs, and more portals; Vendor reports
  - National, State, Regional Notification Systems
- Problems with this way:
  - Personal relationships do not scale; reactive
  - One-way communication, not inter-sector
  - No summary/aggregate; no situational awareness
  - Classification system sometimes a hindrance



# **Initial Toolset Architecture**

- Python 2.6 : Rapid development, readable, maintainable
- Standard python distutils packaging/installation system
- Object-oriented design for better code reuse and quicker detector writing; highly-commented code
- Main Code components:
  - Collectors: netflow5, ascii (csv), syslog
  - BotnetsDetector Superclass:
    - Implements common core features, including: option parsing, whitelisting, history/purge/email, network naming, etc.
  - Subclasses: IrcDetector, Server..., Portscan..., SynFlood..., etc.
- Network operator friendly features
- Runs on Linux (tested on CentOS and Ubuntu)



# Glossary

- DHS Department of Homeland Security
- DHS S&T RTAP CS DHS Science and Technology Rapid Technology Adaptation Program: Cyber Security
- ISAC Information Sharing and Analysis Center
- OSSIM Open Source Security Information Management (by Alienvault)
- PRISEM Public Regional Information Security Event Management
- SEM Security Event Management
- SIEM Security Information and Event Management

