

Correlative Monitoring for Detection of False Data Injection Attacks in Smart Grids

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Agenda

- ❖ **Introduction - Problem Motivation**

False Data Injection: a malicious actor injects “bad data” into the payload of a smart meter

False Data Injection

❖ Consequences

- ❖ Destabilize grid (deteriorates grid's estimation process)
- ❖ Endanger demand response schemes
- ❖ Compromise operation of intelligent buildings
- ❖ Energy theft and price manipulation

❖ Threat Model — Attack scenarios

- ❖ Malware coordinating instantaneous demand drop
- ❖ Nodes programmed to reduce and suddenly increase power demand




Smart Meter Vulnerabilities

- ❖ **Rapid deployment of smart meters entails installing low-cost commodity embedded devices in physically insecure locations with a lengthy operational lifetime (several decades)**

Attacks on Embedded Systems

- ❖ **Stuxnet worm: damaging physical infrastructure**
- ❖ **DDoS report from Arbor Networks: most attacks spawned by embedded systems (e.g., home routers)**
- ❖ **Carna botnet: Internet census from compromised home routers!**




Related Work in Smart Grid Anomaly Detection

- ❖ **Signature-based Methods (e.g., Snort, Bro)**
 - ❖ Needs signatures, could miss polymorphic malware
- ❖ **Specification-based Detection**
 - ❖ Data validation, range checks: can be cumbersome to fine-tune
- ❖ **Behavioral-based Techniques**
 - ❖ Statistical based: classification/clustering
 - ❖ State Space techniques
 - ❖ Graphical based
 - ❖ Game theory methods (price manipulation)

**Network-view
perspective**

AMI Architecture — Bottom-Up Approach

- ❖ Home Area Network (HAN)
 - ❖ Smart meter & appliances
 - ❖ Lightweight communication protocols (WiFi or ZWave)
- ❖ Neighborhood Area Network (NAN)
 - ❖ Aggregates data from HAN meters
 - ❖ Long-range wireless communications (e.g., cellular)
- ❖ Wide Area Network (WAN)
 - ❖ Connects the utility to NANs and data concentrators



Agenda

- ❖ **Introduction - Problem Motivation**
- ❖ **Correlative Monitoring Approach**

HAN Monitoring - Modular Approach

Data Collection


Forecasting

Hypothesis Testing

Dashboard / App

Correlative Monitoring Approach - Data Collection

- ❖ **Data-driven methodology**
- ❖ Associate AMI energy consumption with data from sensors
- ❖ Examples: motion, temperature, circuit information, characteristics of home appliances
- ❖ Off-the-shelf sensors for home automation



HAN Monitoring - Modular Approach


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
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
Correlative Monitoring - Forecasting Module




target variable (t)
Total Electricity



Motion



Hot Water



Indoor
Temperature

Main steps of the detection algorithm

- ❖ **Build predictive model** that forecasts energy consumption in the next time period(s) based on past consumption (over a trailing window) and other sensor readings
 - ❖ Various choices: linear, kernel, GP regression, support vector regression

Upon observing (t_n, \mathbf{x}_n) , compute $y(\mathbf{x}_n, \mathbf{w})$

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$$\text{Compute error } e_n = t_n - y(\mathbf{x}_n, \mathbf{w})$$

HAN Monitoring - Modular Approach

Data Collection

Forecasting

Hypothesis Testing

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
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- ❖ Use **predictive distribution** to calculate the **tail (p-value)** of the error

$$p(e_n | \mathbf{x}_n, \mathbf{t}, \alpha, \beta) = \mathcal{N}(e_n | 0, \sigma_N^2(\mathbf{x}_n))$$

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- ❖ Use Exponentially Weighted Moving Average charts to identify **out-of-control**



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- ❖ **Obtain forecasting error:** (prediction - actual reading)
- ❖ Use **Exponentially Weighted Moving Average** charts to identify **out-of-control**:
 - ❖ forecasting errors
 - ❖ Or their p-values, if reference distribution exists for normal operations (see Lambert and Liu, JASA, 2006)
 - ❖ Extensive literature on selecting adaptive thresholds and memory parameters for the EWMA chart (book by Qiu, 2014)
 - ❖ Employ the two-in-a-row rule to robustly the out-of-control calls (Lucas and Santucci, Technometrics, 1993)

Agenda

- ❖ **Introduction - Problem Motivation**
- ❖ **Correlative Monitoring Approach**
- ❖ **Performance Evaluation**

Evaluation: Smart* dataset

- ❖ Measurement period: May - July 2012
- ❖ Granularity of 1-minute
- ❖ Training window size: 24 hours
- ❖ Forecasting period: 30, 60 minutes
- ❖ Inject random data attacks




TABLE I: Evaluation of detection performance on the Smart* dataset. Values in parenthesis signify standard deviations.

Shift (KW)	Weight λ	Delay (in mins)	Precision	Recall	F1-score
-1	1	9.7 _(7.2)	.29 _(.45)	.07 _(.11)	.11
-1	.53	8.1 _(4.6)	.76 _(.41)	.29 _(.21)	.42
-1	.84	10.4 _(5.5)	.48 _(.50)	.12 _(.14)	.19
1	1	8.0 _(4.5)	.75 _(.43)	.26 _(.19)	.38
1	.53	3.4 _(1.7)	.95 _(.17)	.50 _(.22)	.66
1	.84	6.6 _(3.4)	.86 _(.31)	.31 _(.19)	.46
3	1	1.1 _(.5)	.98 _(.05)	1.00 _(.03)	.99
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3	.84	1.0 _(.2)	.98 _(.06)	1.00 _(.03)	.99
6	1	1.2 _(.9)	.96 _(.11)	.99 _(.05)	.97
6	.53	1.0 _(.0)	.97 _(.08)	1.00 _(.05)	.98
6	.84	1.0 _(0.0)	.96 _(.09)	.99 _(.05)	.98

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Summary & Future Directions

- ❖ Correlative monitoring in HANs, bottom-up approach
- ❖ Proof-of-concept implementation with Raspberry Pi's and Z-Wave sensors - partnership with NextEnergy!
- ❖ Incorporate **energy harvesting sensing!**
- ❖ **Acknowledgements:** Joe Adams, Yeabsera Kebede, Max Morgan, Davis Vorva (UM/Merit), Atman Fozdar (EMU), Wayne Snyder (NextEnergy)
- ❖ Supported by **NSF SATC CNS-1422078**

**“If we have data, let’s look at data.
If all we have are opinions, let’s go with mine.”**

–Jim Barksdale, former Netscape CEO

Supplementary Material

Bayesian Linear Regression

- ❖ **Avoid the need for cross-validation and model selection**
- ❖ **Provides a predictive distribution**
- ❖ **Linear: good choice when data from HAN circuits are available. In addition, with appropriate basis functions non-linearity may not be an issue**

Framework 1 Measurement-based False Data Detection

Require: For each forecasting period: new training set \mathbf{X} and \mathbf{t} .

Require: Control chart parameters λ and L .


Require: Robust threshold θ_r and period ν .

- 1: [Start] Fit the model and begin data monitoring.
 - 2: [Forecast] Upon observing (t_n, \mathbf{x}_n) , compute $y(\mathbf{x}_n, \mathbf{w})$.
 - 3: [Update] Compute error $e_n = t_n - y(\mathbf{x}_n, \mathbf{w})$.
 - 4: [Control Chart] Compute $S_n = f(\lambda, L, e_n)$.
 - 5: [Robust EWMA] Apply two-in-a-row rule on S_n (see section III-B).
 - 6: [Robust Filter] Update $A = \{k : |S_k| > L\sigma_\lambda, k = n - \nu, \dots, n\}$.
 - 7: [Decision] Raise alarm if $|A| > \theta_r$, else system is in-control.
-

DTE Energy Bridge - App access to meter



Precision & Recall



How many selected items are relevant?

$$\text{Precision} = \frac{\text{true positives}}{\text{true positives} + \text{false positives}}$$

How many relevant items are selected?

$$\text{Recall} = \frac{\text{true positives}}{\text{true positives} + \text{false negatives}}$$