North American Network Operators Group|
Date Prev | Date Next |
Date Index |
Thread Index |
Author Index |
Re: Tor and network security/administration
- From: Todd Vierling
- Date: Wed Jun 21 17:09:52 2006
- Domainkey-signature: a=rsa-sha1; q=dns; c=nofws; s=beta; d=gmail.com; h=received:message-id:date:from:sender:to:subject:cc:in-reply-to:mime-version:content-type:content-transfer-encoding:content-disposition:references:x-google-sender-auth; b=aoa0xlA2ZGm1GM8bK4DbR6VaSdOVHpxqppwxfOGd9omMmL+GbCSsKLjRYgFZvmS0hH+ndSqXJrtn6452V/KKuEwqTN6hPdl9f4umWm8k6y9+eQNb1GbtyoeRs8iL6N63sRRv7VtX9G8Gz1UmrEmVDmXQNKewLRHvcaqnBJWNt5Q=
On 6/21/06, Kevin Day <firstname.lastname@example.org> wrote:
Failing that, having an exit node look at HTTP headers back from the
server that contained a "X-No-Anonymous" header to say that the host
at that IP shouldn't allow Tor to use it would work.
What's to stop one or more exit node operators from hacking such a
check right back out of the code?
This is a better idea, but still has a bit of defeats-the-whole-point
to it, as it would depend on people obeying that header voluntarily.
Social vs. technological divide, again.
-- Todd Vierling <email@example.com> <firstname.lastname@example.org> <email@example.com>