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Re: SMTP store and forward requires DSN for integrity (was Re:Clueless anti-virus )
- From: Micheal Patterson
- Date: Fri Dec 09 16:41:13 2005
----- Original Message -----
From: "Douglas Otis" <email@example.com>
To: "Todd Vierling" <firstname.lastname@example.org>
Cc: "Steven J. Sobol" <sjsobol@JustThe.net>; "Geo." <email@example.com>;
Sent: Friday, December 09, 2005 1:58 PM
Subject: Re: SMTP store and forward requires DSN for integrity (was
Re:Clueless anti-virus )
I would rather see the problem stop at the source instead of the current
issue being used as a crutch to attempt to get people to go to BATV or
Mass-Rep (as described in your draft). There's an old military comm saying
that fits perfectly here. "Clean House". For those of you ex comm folks,
you'll probably recognize it. For those of you who don't, it simply means,
fix your stuff before you point blame at the distant end for the problem.
On Dec 9, 2005, at 10:15 AM, Todd Vierling wrote:
This definition would be making at least two of the following
1. Virus "warnings" to forged addresses are UBE, by definition.
1) Malware detection has a 0% false positive.
2) Lack of DSN for email falsely detected containing malware is okay.
3) Purported malware should be assumed to use a forged return-path.
4) The return-path can be validated prior to accepting a message.
5) SMTP should appear to be point-to-point.
6) MTAs with AV filters are the only problem.
While there could be best practices created for AV filtering, it seems
unlikely to be effective. Simplistic filters for DSNs also seem counter
to ensuring the integrity of email delivery. Defending against DSN
exploits with BATV will remove this vector, which in turn will end DSN
exploits attempts over the long term. Why expect others to fix this
problem, when there is a solution that one could make the investment in
to deploy. This will reduce this problem over the long term. The BATV
alternative would not cause otherwise valuable DSNs to be lost, nor make
assumptions about the quality of malware detection.
If you can't trust AV handling of DSNs, why trust their detections?
Would you rather see emails simply disappear?
Do you not comprehend what's really being said here Doug? Yes, blocking /
rejecting of a DSN is a BAD thing and should never be done. Rejecting of a
notification of malware != the same thing. If the reciever of "your" DSN
didn't sent the message, then it's no longer a DSN.. It's now officially, by
definition, UBE from YOU to the incorrect originator now isn't it. This is
the case in the majority of malware notifications by anyone / anything that
generates them. More than likely, the viri / trojan writer is "depending" on
them to help propogate their ilk because they too can be network admins and
are aware that DSN's don't get tossed. What better method to get them out to
the masses but to have our main feeds, and huge pipes help them along? I
mean, really, who's better to help them? Mom and dat with the 56k dialup or
us with the DS3's - OC12's to help them along? Look at the big picture Doug
instead of 45 degrees to the left and right. You hate spam, I hate spam, I
don't send DSN's to senders because I know that roughly 90% of them are
bogus. You feel that's bad. You have the right to disagree. I have the
right to deny traffic that is in response to traffic that didn't originate
from my network(s) regardless of your belief.
When the recipient is a legitimate email provider, it could seriously
lower the integrity of email delivery for these providers to toss DSNs
because many fall into a category you want to define as UBE. While I
agree whole heartily this malware notification problem stinks, there is a
much safer and surer solution.
2. It is the responsibility of the *SENDER* not to send UBE.