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RE: Proper authentication model
- From: Hannigan, Martin
- Date: Wed Jan 12 12:59:58 2005
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Joe Abley [mailto:firstname.lastname@example.org]
> Sent: Wednesday, January 12, 2005 12:05 PM
> To: Hannigan, Martin
> Cc: NANOG list
> Subject: Re: Proper authentication model
> On 12 Jan 2005, at 11:53, Hannigan, Martin wrote:
> >> You mean you'd *request* a different path from different providers.
> > Provisioning a circuit from two different ^providers^, other than
> > your OC3 provider.
> I realise that's what you meant.
> My point was that competing, differently-named and
> organisationally-separate suppliers of network services
> frequently use
> common suppliers for metro fibre, long-haul transport,
> building access,
> etc. Just because you buy different services from different providers
> doesn't mean there will be no common points of failure.
There may be common points of failure like a carrier hotel, but I
haven't been told I couldn't see loop or longhaul maps when planning
a circuit, except when buying from other than a carrier or tier2.
Primary and protect should be geographically seperated and if
your carrier isn't buying access to BOTH conduits in your entrance
facility, you should ask why. I just don't usually see this problem
and I've *never* not been able to get into a facility remotely by
the diversified frame M/S method.
If we're talking semantics, order type 2 ds0s.
 I'm talking RBOC tier1 for the most part. I would consider tier 1
to be SBC, AT&T, MCI, Sprint, etc. Facilities based.