The trick is for IXPs and NAPs to have terms that *require* people to:-
On Mon, Aug 25, 2003 at 07:41:34PM -0400, Joe Abley wrote:
> On Monday, 25 August 2003, at 19:08PM, Haesu wrote:
> >You ARE correct. If everyone employs IRR and put explicit filters
> >it'd be the perfect world..
> ... if everybody used the IRR to build explicit filters everywhere, if
> everybody kept their objects in the IRR up-to-date, and if there was
> some appropriate authorisation scheme in place to allow you to trust
> the data in the IRR implicitly, it'd be a perfect world.
> The IRR is currently a reasonable tool to use to avoid listening to
> routes which are advertised by mistake from peers who populate the IRR
> accurately. It's not a reasonable tool for avoiding maliciously bogus
> routes, since sticking maliciously bogus information in the IRR is
You of course are correct with the trusting of the data, but
we are in a somewhat of a chicken and egg situation. If people don't
trust the IRR, they don't filter on it, and then the data is
allowed to get out of date.