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Re: Dave Farber comments on Re: Major Labels v. Backbones

  • From: Stephen J. Wilcox
  • Date: Sat Aug 17 16:33:32 2002


Digital data is much easier to move that the physical items of economic
blockades which are also restricted not only by customs but by them appearing on
accounts etc which should declare enough info to show a business was acting
illegally by sending to a blockaded nation.

In telecoms (inc ISP) you can simply shift the data through a couple of
intermediaries and circumvent the restriction. With IP, the blockaded nation can
even source IPs that make it look as tho its from another nation - who will find

If its on CDROM again just send through an intermediary, its small and easy
enough, not exactly a logistics puzzle..

And I really dont see the point on restricting software (crypto) which is freely
and publically available in one country (ie US) - its so easy to get the
technology into the restricted countries. Just a waste of bureaucratic cash and
keeping someone in a job somewhere imho.

Why waste time, effort and cash on things so futile! Stick to economic sanctions
which are enforcable!


On 17 Aug 2002, Paul Vixie wrote:

> (Sean Donelan) writes:
> > The record labels don't want to give you that choice.  If you read the
> > complaint you'll notice the record companies never attempted to contact
> > the immediate upstream ISP in China.  ...
> Am I the only one who finds it odd that it's illegal to export crypto or
> "supercomputers" to certain nations or to sell such goods with prior
> knowledge that the goods are going to be resold in those nations... or
> even to travel to certain nations... yet no law prohibits establishing
> a link and a BGP session to ISP's within those nations, or to ISP's who
> are known to have links and BGP sessions to ISP's within those nations?
> How long, in this new era of homeland security, can we expect it to last?
> How long before someone has to say "I'm sorry, I can't peer with you or sell
> you transit because you have downstreams or peers inside the axis of evil"?
> I'm not sure I'd be opposed to it, since economic blockades do appear to
> have some effect, and since data is a valuable import/export commodity.  I
> think homeland security is a good thing if it means a mandate for IPsec,
> DNSSEC, edge RPF, etc... but if we *mean* it, then why are US packets able
> to reach ISP's in hostile nations?
> (My bet is that within 6.5 minutes of this message going out, there will be
> at least one public flame on the topic of "how freedom of information is
> the only way to bring down a totalitarian regime".  Save it, please -- I can
> write, have written, and will write that whitepaper myself.  This is not
> the same topic.  I want to know what the homeland security department is
> likely to do about all this, not what is good/bad for the citizens of
> hostile nations or even nonhostile nations.)

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