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Re: RFC 1771, further thoughts

  • From: Larry Diffey
  • Date: Wed Jun 27 01:57:21 2001

I think that we should petition the Federal Government to set up a master
BGP route server and everyone must peer with the government.  That would fix
things.  The government always makes it better.  I'm sure that the project
could be done for less than $3 billion dollars.  Anyone want to sign up as
an independent contractor?

Larry Diffey
CCNA and all around nice guy
ldiffey@technologyforward.com



----- Original Message -----
From: "Marshall Eubanks" <tme@21rst-century.com>
To: <lucifer@lightbearer.com>; <nanog@merit.edu>
Sent: Tuesday, June 26, 2001 9:27 PM
Subject: Re: RFC 1771, further thoughts


>
> >
> >In an attempt to return to an argument, rather than simple contradiction
> >(ok, ok, it's far more polite and reasonable so far than that would
imply,
>
> >but I couldn't miss the cheap shot; apologies hereby tendered), perhaps
we
>
> >should consider *what* the RFC should say, if it should be changed? Going
> >to the WG with a proposal in hand and a rationale to support it would
seem
>
> >to be the best path.
> >
> >So, a summary of my view on it at the moment:
> >
> >Assumption #1) Resetting a BGP session is 'costly'. Both in terms of the
> >time it takes, the stability it removes, and the fact that it flaps all
> >of your *outgoing* announcements as well as incoming ones.
> >
> >Assumption #2) A router that sends a malformed route is clearly doing
> >something which it Should Not Be Doing (tm) (ok, this might be axiomatic,
> >but should still be laid out)
> >
> >Assumption #3) The current practice has been shown to demonstrably
> >increase the brittleness of the Internet, by causing severe flapping when
> >someone only partially follows the RFC (in particular, propagating bad
> >route data, whether or not the origional source session is reset).
> >
> >Assumption #4) Routing errors which are bad data, but *not* malformed
> >routes, will not generally be caught by normal means in normal operation,
> >until a case of human intervention to cross-check the data.
> >
> >Assumption #5) Any router which breaks so badly as to start spewing large
> >amounts of validly formed but errorneous data, and is *also* spewing
badly
>
> >formed data, will spew noticeable amounts of said badly formed data.
(This
>
> >one is key, and is only a conjecture; field evidence would be of great
use
>
> >in validating it).
> >
> Hello;
>
> Can "badly formed data" be reasonably clearly defined ?
> What tests are there for "validly formed but errorneous data" ?
>
> There are  several monitoring efforts (including the one done here) which
compare
> sets of (m)bgp routing tables over time.
> It seems to me that such (m)bgp pollution
> should be detectable with a monitoring project.
>
> BTW, what seems to be the clearest sign here of the
> recent flap was the dropping of
> 43 Autonomous Systems by UU.net for the
> Sat Jun 23 16:37:41 2001 status run. This is not a good
> enough metric to relieably detect such problems. There do seem to be a lot
of
> weird changes in the routing table in that
> dump, but a simple test for this is not apparent to me at present.
>
> Regards
> Marshall Eubanks
>
>    Multicast Technologies, Inc.
>    10301 Democracy Lane, Suite 410
>    Fairfax, Virginia 22030
>    Phone : 703-293-9624          Fax     : 703-293-9609
>    e-mail : tme@on-the-i.com     http://www.on-the-i.com
>
>
> >Conclusion: changing the RFC from saying you MUST do a NOTIFY and ditch
the
>
> >session could be adjusted to stating that you MUST handle the error in
one
>
> >of two ways: do a NOTIFY and ditch the session (traditional), or send an
> >ALERT and discard the badly formed route. Additionally, this alternative
> >handling MUST NOT be enabled by default, and SHOULD have a threshhold
> >parameter at which the session will undergo a NOTIFY/reset, under the
> >assumption that the host sending an appreciable amount of badly formed
> >routes is, in fact, in danger of sending correctly formed but erroneous
> >data as well.
> >
> >Suitable threshold values are left as an excercise to local admins and
BCP
>
> >documents; I would think this could be negotiated as a capability
extension
>
> >to BGP4, with the fallback, of course, being to follow the traditional
RFC
>
> >practice.
> >
> >Thoughts?
> >--
>
>***************************************************************************
>
> >Joel Baker                           System Administrator -
lightbearer.com
>
> >lucifer@lightbearer.com              http://www.lightbearer.com/~lucifer
> >
>
> Marshall Eubanks
>
> tme@21rst-century.com
>





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