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Re: Filtering ICMP (Was Re: SMURF amplifier block list)

  • From: Pete Ashdown
  • Date: Fri Apr 24 12:37:23 1998

Jason Lixfeld said once upon a time:

>Seriously.. what do you recommend?  I'm totally open.  I'm using deny icmp
>to protect myself.  I'm up to an alternative.

>:> You could always "deny icmp any aaa.bbb.ccc.ddd www.ccc.nnn.mmm log" on

There apparently is a bit of misunderstanding when it comes to how a smurf
attack works.  To understand a smurf attack you need to understand a
standard ping request.

Say we have a remote ping destination, named "target" and a originator of
the ping request named "source".  In the first step of a ping request,
"source" sends an ICMP request of "echo" to "target":

	"source"  --- ICMP echo ---> "target"

When "target" receives the ICMP echo, it sends back an ICMP echo-reply to
"source"

        "source"  <--- ICMP echo-reply --- "target"

Upon reception of the "echo-reply" "source" realizes a good ping and coughs
you back the statistics on how long the whole interaction was.

With a smurf attack you have a perpetrator forging the "source" address,
which in this case could also be known as victim.  The perp takes advantage
of open directed-broadcast networks to get lots of addresses responding
back to the "source" (victim) with "echo-reply".  Thus the original request
looks like this:

    perp (forged "source") --- ICMP echo ---> "target" (directed-broadcast)

and the reply looks like this:

    "source" (victim) <==== ICMP echo-reply x "target" addresses listening to
                                              the broadcast request for
                                              ping echo

You can easily see how the broadcast size of "target" and whether it is
open to "directed-broadcast" is the fundamental exploit in the smurf
attack.  The larger the subnet, the better.  However, it is also easy to
see that by blocking just "echo-reply" to certain addresses (IRC servers,
Quake servers, etc), you can at least minimize the effects of the attack.
The sad part is, the en masse echo-replies will still travel over your pipe
to get to your filter and will still consume a significant portion of your
bandwidth.

Note, my understanding of the function of "directed-broadcast" is limited
by the fact that I've never used it in a useful function.




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